In addition, many of the tanks listed as destroyed were first abandoned by their crews and destroyed by Ukrainian soldiers who either could not or chose not to capture them. At the beginning of April, for example, 53 percent of Russia’s recorded tank losses were abandoned. (The figure jumps to 38 percent if damaged tanks are included.) This percentage was highest during the first month of the war when Russia’s tank losses were the greatest.

Of the 994 Russian tank losses documented by the Oryx blog, a website that uses open source tools to count destroyed Russian equipment, at least 340 - or 34 percent - were abandoned. Many of the supposed weaknesses of manned ground, aerial, and naval platforms were a result of these mistakes, not a reflection of their technical relevance in modern warfare. As a result, the opening phase of this war may not be a good indication of how effective tanks and other systems would prove to be in a better-organized military operation. This decision was likely made at the political level, since the Russian military’s doctrine, exercises, and previous conflicts all prioritized combined arms. In addition, Russian forces were given insufficient time to prepare for such a complex operation. Russian ground units simply drove toward cities, unprepared for a fight. Because they expected little resistance, Russian forces made minimal attempts at executing a coherent combined-arms operation, which would have required careful coordination and planning between air, ground, and naval forces. Russia’s initial operation prioritized speed and secrecy above all other factors. The use of Javelins and other light anti-tank systems in Ukraine has not demonstrated that the tank is obsolete any more than the Sagger anti-tank guided missile did in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as discussed by David Johnson in these pages. Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support, and Ukrainian artillery. The available data from Ukraine, as well as the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, indicate that tanks are still critical in modern warfare and their vulnerabilities have been exaggerated. As a result, specific weapon systems may appear to be ineffective based on how and where they are employed, not necessarily due to their inherent shortcomings. There is still much about this war that is not known from open sources, and there is good reason to think that the conditions that marked its early phases will not necessarily be relevant to future conflicts. After six months of war in Ukraine, some observers have insisted that “we are seeing the very nature of combat change” and that tanks, along with fighter jets and warships, “are being pushed into obsolescence.”īut it is too soon to write off the tank, and we should resist jumping to other sweeping conclusions about the future of warfare based on a conflict whose lessons are not yet clear.

Battle tank force field